I. INTRODUCTION
T he estimated magnitude of the informal economy in the United States was between 7 and 10 percent of offi cial gross national product during the late 1990s and early 2000s (Dell'Ano and Solomon, 2008; Schneider and Enste, 2000; Schneider, 2005) . Cross-country studies suggest that higher tax burdens lead to growth of informal activities (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Schneider and Buehn, 2012) . Relatively few studies, however, examine the effect of tax rates on individuals' participation in the informal labor market. This paper examines how low-income, urban, unmarried men and women in the United States alter their regular and informal labor supply in response to tax credits.
The informal sector is often defi ned as consisting of both illegal activity and business activities that are not inherently unlawful but operate outside tax and regulatory systems. One consequence of a large informal sector is lost tax revenue: the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimated the federal tax gap due to non-fi ling or underreporting of individual income at $260 billion in 2006 (Internal Revenue Service, 2012) . But when governments offer tax credits like the earned income tax credit (EITC), workers in the informal sector forego benefi ts when they do not report their income.
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The EITC may induce low-income workers to shift from informal to regular employment because the credit subsidizes regular work. Although these sectoral changes and increased income reporting could increase EITC program expenditures, there are some advantages to encouraging more reporting of informal work. First, the EITC is a powerful poverty-reduction program (Eissa and Hoynes, 2006) . Additionally, low-income individuals would gain increased access to the social welfare programs related to the payroll tax by reporting income and paying payroll taxes on that income. And since the majority of EITC claimants use paid preparers to fi le returns, encouraging reporting might encourage them to keep better fi nancial records and to access better fi nancial advice (Infranca, 2008) . Also, encouraging income reporting for EITC purposes could improve compliance even in years when households do not claim the EITC if it is diffi cult to change reporting status once the decision is made to work on the books or if reporting income in one year makes it easier for the IRS to identify unreported income in future. It might also improve social norms surrounding tax compliance.
In this study, variation in state EITCs between 1997-2005 is used to estimate the effect of tax credits on labor force participation in both the regular and informal sectors among unmarried urban men and women with children. The paper takes advantage of four waves of detailed longitudinal data on participation and hours worked in the regular and informal sectors from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study. Participation rates in informal work among survey respondents are high: over 30 percent of unmarried men and 15 percent of unmarried women report working in the informal sector during most waves of the survey. This paper contributes the fi rst estimates of the role of taxes on informal labor supply using panel survey data. The results indicate that increasing a state's refundable EITC by 10 percent of the federal credit decreases men's participation in the informal sector by 7.3 percentage points and decreases work in the informal sector by 2.2 hours per week, conditional on participation in the regular sector. Expanding a state's EITC does not signifi cantly affect men's regular labor force participation but it increases work in the regular sector by 4.5 hours per week on average. There is no signifi cant effect on men's total hours worked. Single fathers appear to respond to EITC expansions by engaging in more regular work and less informal work or by increasing their income reporting without changing their total labor supply. For women, the results show no signifi cant effect of state EITCs on participation in either regular or informal work, but do indicate that single mothers reduce their regular-sector and total hours in response to increases in state EITCs.
These results contrast with the existing literature on labor supply and the EITC, which has generally focused on single mothers and found that they increase labor force participation in response to the EITC but do not respond on the intensive margin. Men may be more likely than women to respond to the EITC by changing their sectoral choice or their reporting instead of their participation or total labor supply because men's regular-sector labor force participation rates are already higher than women's: in national data, the male and female labor force participation rates were 73.3 percent and 59.0 percent respectively in 2005 (Toossi, 2006) . Similar participation rates are found in the Fragile Families data. The lack of a participation effect on regular labor force participation for women in this sample may occur because the women in the Fragile Families sample are all mothers of children age 5 or younger, which may make them less responsive to tax credits than single mothers overall.
II. FRAGILE FAMILIES' PARTICIPATION IN THE INFORMAL ECONOMY
Although a number of studies have used macroeconomic data to estimate the overall size of the informal economy, national surveys generally have not collected data on the rate of participation in informal work. Frey and Schneider (2001) review the methods used to estimate the size of the informal economy using macroeconomic data. O'Neill (1983) used data from the Current Population Survey to estimate that 27.1 percent of men and 13.5 percent of women worked in the informal sector, but his approach assumes that total labor force participation remains constant and that changes in offi cial statistics refl ect changes in informal participation. Several small-scale, location-specifi c surveys provide direct measures of participation in informal work. Lemieux, Fortin, and Frechette (1994) survey Quebec City workers and report underground sector participation rates were 8.5 percent overall and 23.3 percent for men age 18-24. Edin and Lein (1997) fi nd that, among 379 mothers in four U.S. cities, 39 percent of welfare-reliant mothers and 28 percent of wage-reliant mothers engaged in supplemental unreported work.
1 Industries with high concentrations of informal workers include domestic services, lawn and garden maintenance, home repairs, machine operators, and farm and construction workers (McCrohan, Smith, and Adams, 1991; Marcelli, Pastor, and Joassart-Marcelli, 1999) .
The Fragile Families survey is unique in that it is a large-scale, longitudinal study that asks detailed questions about informal economy participation. This survey followed mothers and fathers of babies born in large U.S. cities for fi ve years after the child's birth and includes information on regular work, work off the books in respondents' own businesses, and illegal activities at four time periods. The Fragile Families data are constructed as follows: a total of 4,898 hospital births occurring between 1998 and 2000 in 20 U.S. cities with populations of over 200,000 were sampled and separate mother and father interviews were obtained at birth and at the child's fi rst, third, and fi fth birthdays. Baseline interviews took place in different years in different cities and the resulting data span tax years 1997-2005. Non-marital births were oversampled relative to marital births: approximately 75 percent of births in the sample were nonmarital. Reichman et al. (2001) provide detailed information about the sampling scheme.
The sample differs from the U.S. population at large in important ways. Because the sample is based on births, all survey respondents are parents, whose connections to the informal economy may be different than those of individuals without children. The respondents are disproportionately low-income and minority relative to the overall U.S. population. Mothers' data are representative of births occurring in U.S. cities with populations over 200,000 when weighted to account for oversampling of non-marital births. Fathers' data are not nationally representative: whether a father interview was obtained for the birth depended in part on the strength of his relationship with the mother. Fathers who had stronger relationships with the birth mother were more likely to visit the hospital during or after the birth and to participate in an interview. Consequently, the results of this study cannot be interpreted as indicative of the average response for the U.S. population as a whole. Despite these limitations, the unusually detailed panel data on informal economy participation provides an excellent opportunity to examine how urban workers respond to the EITC.
The Fragile Families survey questions about informal work attempt to capture both illegal activity and legal activities that are not reported to tax or regulatory authorities. Respondents were asked whether they participated in off-the-books work; worked in their own business; engaged in drug sales, prostitution, or other illegal activity; or did other work for cash.
2 Survey professionals distinguished between informal and regular work in self-employment: they instructed respondents to include regular income from self-employment or their own business as regular-sector work. Respondents reported their earnings, weeks worked per year, and average hours worked per week for both regular and informal work. Fathers were asked these questions in all four waves. Mothers answered these questions for the three waves after the baseline. Table 1 shows labor force participation rates in both sectors. Unmarried men are signifi cantly more likely to participate in regular work: 70 percent of single fathers work in the regular sector in Wave 4 compared to only 59 percent of single mothers. Men are also more likely to work informally, with informal-sector participation rates ranging from 20 to 37 percent across waves for single men and from 12 to 16 percent for single women. Rates of off-the-books work or work in own business are much higher than self-reported rates of inherently illegal activity. In the last wave, respondents were not asked about off-the-books work but were asked about the other categories of informal work. Not surprisingly, fewer respondents report informal work in this wave. Average informal earnings for men are more than double the average informal earnings reported by women. The difference in earnings suggests that informal-sector wages are higher for men than for women in this sample because men and women report similar average informal hours worked. Using survey data on informal work is challenging because respondents may not be truthful when asked about participation in illegal or informal work. There is no way to know the extent of underreporting, but the participation rates in Fragile Families are similar to those estimated by O'Neill (1983) and higher than those found by Lemieux, Fortin, and Frechette (1994) . The primary focus of the Fragile Families study is family dynamics, so the majority of questions in the survey focus on relationship histories and beliefs about child-rearing. The survey may encourage truthful responses by deemphasizing the importance of income and employment.
Respondents transition in and out of the informal sector frequently. Between 32 and 49 percent of men and between 32 and 45 percent of women who report informal work in any given wave continue participation in the following wave. If we consider four categories of labor force participation (regular sector only, both regular and informal sectors, informal sector only, and neither) only 50 percent of men's wave-to-wave observations involve no change in category, as shown in Table 2 (sum of diagonal entries). The most frequent change in categories for men is between working in the regular sector only in one wave and in both sectors in the other wave, accounting for 17.6 percent of wave-to-wave observations. An additional 17 percent of transitions are between the informal sector and either the regular sector, neither, or both. 4 Women are slightly less likely to switch from one category of labor market participation to another (56 percent of wave-to-wave observations involve no transitions), largely due to a much higher percentage who never work in either sector. For women who do change categories, the most frequent change is between regular work and no work, accounting for 24 percent of observations. Only 18 percent of women's transitions involve changes in informal sector participation, compared to 34 percent of men's transitions. Women may be less able to substitute between regular and informal work because only 46 to 50 percent of women who work informally in a given wave also work in the regular sector compared to 62 to 70 percent of men. Women's lower transition rates will make it more diffi cult to identify tax-induced changes in women's informal labor supply.
III. EITCs AND WORK INCENTIVES IN THE REGULAR AND INFORMAL SECTORS
Changes in state EITCs provide the identifying variation in tax rates in this study. State EITCs are typically designed as a percentage of the federal EITC and can be used to offset state tax liabilities. The federal EITC was designed to reward work and is currently the largest cash transfer program for low-income families. The federal credit (and consequently any state credit based on it) is characterized by (1) a phase-in region in which earned income is low and only part of the maximum credit may be claimed; (2) a plateau region of earned income in which taxpayers can claim the maximum credit; and (3) the phase-out region in which the amount of the maximum credit that may be claimed decreases with income. Because the federal credit is refundable, the credit claimed may be greater than the tax liability, resulting in a refund. Not all state EITCs are refundable.
Federal EITC benefi ts depend on whether fi lers claim zero, one, or two or more qualifying children under age 19. In 2005, the maximum federal credits were $399, $2,662, and $4,400 respectively. Because state EITCs function as a percentage of the federal credit, they expand the differences in combined state and federal credit dollar value depending on the number of children claimed. A fi ler's own children, step-children, adopted children, and their descendants, and in some cases siblings or step-siblings and their descendants, can count as children. When two or more relatives, such as unmarried parents, wish to claim a child for the EITC, the residency requirement is the key test for determining eligibility: a tax fi ler must live with the child for at least half the year to be eligible to claim the child for the credit. Prior to 2002, if two taxpayers met the residency test only the individual with higher adjusted gross income was eligible to claim the child claimed for EITC purposes. In 2002, this "AGI tiebreaker rule" was simplifi ed. Instead of determining who is eligible to claim the child, it is now used only to allocate the child in cases where two taxpayers fail to coordinate and both claim the child. In a standard labor supply model in which an unmarried individual decides whether and how much to work, the EITC unambiguously increases labor force participation: any taxpayer who worked before is still better off working and some who did not work before will be induced to work. Empirical work has generally found relatively large effects of the EITC on single mothers' labor force participation (Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000; Ellwood, 2000; Grogger, 2003; Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz, 2006) . The predicted effect of the EITC on hours worked depends on the region of the credit. In the phase-in region, the theoretical effect on hours worked is ambiguous due to offsetting income and substitution effects. In the plateau region, the pure income effect unambiguously decreases optimal hours worked. In the phase-out region, income and substitution effects both discourage work. Although most EITC recipients' income places them in the plateau or phase-out region of the credit, past empirical studies have generally found no effects of the EITC on hours worked; Eissa and Hoynes (2006) and Meyer (2010) review this literature.
The standard EITC labor supply model described above focuses on single taxpayers and ignores household labor supply issues. (Eissa and Hoynes (2004) analyze EITC effects on married couples' labor supply.) The frequency of cohabitation in the Fragile Families data makes ignoring household labor supply considerations problematic even for unmarried taxpayers: by the fourth wave of the survey, 63 percent of never-married fathers and 72 percent of mothers report cohabiting with a partner in at least one wave.
If only one parent is EITC-eligible and the credit increases, the return to their labor force participation increases relative to that of the parent who is not eligible, resulting in a substitution effect across workers as well as a household income effect. There should be an unambiguous increase in labor force participation among EITC-eligible parents, but we could also expect a decrease in labor supply among the non-eligible partners. If both parents are already in the labor force, then the substitution effects will depend on the recipient parent's income and the resulting region of the credit. If there are multiple children in the household or if both parents are EITC-eligible, the possibilities are numerous as the children may be split among the parents for EITC purposes. Under current rules, cohabiting unmarried parents could split their EITC-eligible children across two tax returns. Since parents can substitute on both the margin of who claims the child(ren) and whether/how much they work, predicting the effects of a change in EITC policy on cohabiting couples' labor supply is diffi cult. Other factors may also affect parents' willingness to bargain over who claims the child for EITC purposes, such as if the parents have different propensities to spend refunded tax credits on the child. Now consider the choice of labor supply across the regular and informal sectors. Even when modeling the labor supply decisions of a single taxpayer who is not affected by joint labor supply considerations, expanding the standard labor supply model to include two sectors makes the problem of how the EITC will affect labor supply signifi cantly more diffi cult because individuals can now substitute either on the labor/leisure margin or the sectoral margin. Sandmo (1981) and Cowell (1985) demonstrate that when the seminal Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki model of tax evasion is extended to include endogenous labor supply in taxed and untaxed sectors, individuals' ability to substitute either on the labor/leisure margin or the sectoral margin means that it is impossible to sign the effects of a tax change on sectoral labor supply without restricting the utility function by specifying the nature of risk aversion or imposing separability of the utility or labor supply functions. When extending these models to include EITC credit phase-in and phase-out rates, it is also impossible to sign the effects of changes in these rates because these are simply adjustments to the marginal tax rate in particular income regions. Further extensions consider other factors that affect sectoral choice and compliance behavior such as social norms, perceptions of tax fairness, and non-tax differences between work in the two sectors; Slemrod (2007) and Torgler (2007) describe these models.
Parents who can access both the informal and regular sectors and make household labor supply decisions or bargain over who claims a child for EITC purposes can respond to policy changes on the labor/leisure margin, the margin of who in the household works, the margin of who claims the child, and the sectoral choice margin. In the face of this complexity, empirical analysis is our best hope for understanding how the EITC alters labor supply in the informal and regular sector.
Several reforms to the EITC have been proposed recently, including expanding the childless EITC, increasing EITC benefi ts for noncustodial parents, and altering the subsidy rates or phase-in or phase-out regions. Eissa and Hoynes (2011) discuss potential distributional and welfare effects of most of these reforms, several of which would increase single men's EITCs. Estimates of the effect of the EITC on regular versus informal work could improve this type of welfare analysis.
IV. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON TAX RATES AND PARTICIPATION IN THE INFORMAL ECONOMY
Few empirical studies examine the relationship between tax rates and informal labor supply. Two studies from the early 1990s use a survey of workers in Quebec in which jobs were classifi ed based on whether they were reported to tax authorities; these report mixed results. Lemieux, Fortin, and Frechette (1994) fi nd a positive but insignifi cant effect of marginal tax rates on underground earnings and generally conclude that the tax system does not signifi cantly alter sectoral choice decisions for the average worker. Lacroix and Fortin (1992) estimate a structural model of participation in the underground sector and fi nd that an increase in the likelihood of audit and the penalty rate on detected evasion are both associated with a small increase in hours in the regular sector and larger decrease in hours in the untaxed sector. The elasticity of hours with respect to the tax rate suggests that a higher tax rate increases hours worked in the untaxed sector.
Most U.S. studies of the impact of tax rates on the informal economy have examined the effect of tax rates on reported income rather than informal labor supply and have used tax compliance data or tax administrative data. Slemrod and Weber (2012) and Alm (2012) discuss the current state of the literature. Joulfaian and Rider (1996) use data from the 1988 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program and fi nd that the federal EITC has no effect on income under or over reporting. However, the 1988 federal EITC was much smaller and less well-known than the current program. Clotfelter (1983) fi nds elasticities of underreported income with respect to the marginal tax rate between 0.5 and 3.0 depending on the type of return, the measure of income, and the income level. LaLumia (2009) examines the effects of EITC phase-in and phase-out rates on whether individuals report self-employment income and fi nds that increasing the EITC phase-in rate increases the share of returns with Schedule C self-employment income.
One prior study has attempted to use the Fragile Families survey data to examine the relationship between tax rates and informal work. Rich and Kim (2001) use the fi rst wave of the Fragile Families data to look at participation rates and hours worked in the underground economy and fi nd negative but insignifi cant effects of federal, state, and local tax rates on participation in the underground. They use variation in personal state and local tax rates to identify the effect of taxes on labor supply but do not instrument for tax rates, and their estimates are likely to suffer from endogeneity problems. Rich and Kim fi nd that alcohol and drug use are strongly associated with informal economy participation rates, suggesting that barriers to regular-sector employment may be important determinants in informal-sector participation.
To my knowledge, this is the fi rst study to use national longitudinal survey data to examine the impact of tax rates on informal work. Understanding whether and how much men's and women's informal and regular labor supply responds to tax changes will help us understand the effects of tax laws on real labor supply rather than only on formal work or taxed income. Additionally, this study provides some of the fi rst estimates of labor supply responses of single men to the EITC, although single men receive approximately 20 percent of EITC funds, as shown in Table 3 . Six million single men receive the EITC, 3.4 million of whom claim qualifying children, and the average EITC for single men is $1,376, according to 2005 Statistics of Income data.
5 Several current policy initiatives have proposed expanding the childless EITC or offering the EITC to noncustodial parents. Better understanding how men respond to the current EITC and how informal work substitutes for regular work would help policymakers evaluate those initiatives.
V. IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
To identify the effect of the EITC on informal and regular sector labor supply, I begin with a standard differences-in-differences specifi cation,
where L ist is labor supply of individual i in state s in year t, EITCrate st is the percentage of the federal credit available as a state EITC in state s in year t, X ist is a vector of time-variant individual characteristics, Z ist is a vector of time-variant state characteristics, μ s are state fi xed effects, and η t are year fi xed effects.
I treat an individual as working in the informal sector if they report working in any of the four categories of informal work: off-the-books work, work in their own business for which they do not receive a regular paycheck, illegal activities, and other activities.
6
I use the sum of hours worked in all types of informal work as the number of hours worked per week in the informal sector. Respondents report usual hours worked per week directly for regular work and each type of informal work.
The sample is restricted to men and women who were unmarried at baseline and remain single for all subsequent waves to ensure that all individuals in the sample are primary earners for the purposes of taxation. Including both married and single individuals would mean that individuals with the same labor supply choices and household composition would face different EITC incentives, which would make the estimated effects of EITC changes more diffi cult to identify and interpret. For example, consider a married couple in which the husband is the primary earner and his income is in the phase-out region of the EITC. The EITC would increase the marginal tax rate on the fi rst dollar of the wife's regular-sector income and lower the return to the wife's regularsector work. If the couple were unmarried, then woman would be treated as a primary earner for EITC purposes and the credit would have different incentive effects because the marginal tax rate on the fi rst dollar of the woman's income would be determined by the EITC phase-in rate.
7
Restricting the sample to persistently unmarried individuals only reduces the sample by 26 to 27 percent of person observations and 19 to 21 percent of person-year observations, depending on the specifi cation, because the Fragile Families survey over-samples non-marital births. The results are similar when I relax the restriction on marriage and run the models on the entire Fragile Families sample. I also estimate effects for men and women separately because men and women have very different reported participation rates in the informal economy and because single men are not eligible for most other welfare programs available to low-income single women with children.
Differences in state EITCs across states and over time provide the identifying variation. Six of the 15 states from which Fragile Families observations were drawn at baseline modifi ed their EITCs during the 1997-2005 period (the tax years spanned by the Fragile Families survey data), effectively altering the maximum credit and the phase-in and phase-out rates and providing plausibly exogenous variation in EITC parameters. Table  4 summarizes these changes.
8 There were no changes in the federal EITC for single or head-of-household fi lers during this time. In this basic specifi cation, I pool the data from all four waves of the panel and cluster the standard errors at the state level.
I also estimate the model on mean-differenced data to take advantage of the Fragile Families panel, which contains up to four observations per individual. This individual fi xed effects specifi cation uses only the cross-time variation in state EITCs within individuals to identify the effect on regular and informal work. This controls for unobserved time-invariant individual characteristics such as aspects of taste for risk or access to the regular sector or informal sector. The key assumptions of the identifi cation strategy are that in the absence of changes in state EITC policy there would be no differential changes in informal work and that a state's tendency to introduce an EITC is independent of the initial level of informal economic activity.
Because differences in other state policies and in state labor market conditions could result in differences across states, I control for state minimum wages and state monthly welfare benefi t levels for a family of three. State minimum wages come from U.S. Department of Labor Wages and Hours Division historical tables. State welfare benefi t level are from Ziliak (2007) . 9 Although it would be desirable to control for other aspects of state welfare systems such as differences in time limits and work requirements, these measures do not vary suffi ciently in the data both because most respondents live in one of 15 states and because all waves of the data were collected after welfare reform so there is limited time variation in state policies. I also control for the state unemployment rate and the state marginal tax rate (exclusive of EITC) for a single tax fi ler with one 10 I account for other changes in federal policies affecting lowand moderate-income households, such as changes in the refundability of the child tax credit and the 2001 tax bracket changes, using year dummies and an indicator for whether the observation is from the period after passage of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001.
At the individual level, I control for demographic characteristics including age and age squared, education, cohabitation status, number of children in the household, and regular-sector hourly wages.
11 In sensitivity tests (available upon request) I also include occupation codes for the most recent regular-sector job, indicators for whether the father has served jail time, whether the father is subject to a legal child support order, and whether the mother received welfare payments from the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program in the past year. The results are not sensitive to the inclusion of any of these controls.
The estimation strategy does not account for the different work incentives associated with the phase-in, plateau, and phase-out regions for several reasons. First, examining different effects in different regions of the credit requires knowledge of which region of the credit is relevant, which requires knowing taxable income, tax fi ling status, and the number of children claimed for the credit. The Fragile Families data do not allow measurement of these with enough confi dence to identify the relevant credit region. Even with this information, the endogeneity of earnings further complicates estimating separate effects in different regions of the credit. Saez (2010) fi nds strong evidence of bunching around the kink between the phasein and plateau regions of the EITC, particularly among self-employed workers, which suggests that individuals who work in the informal sector would also be sensitive to the kink points in the EITC schedule.
12 Although the estimates below do not capture different responses by credit region, they do represent the net effect of the state EITC policy on the Fragile Families sample. The EITC coeffi cient identifi es the average effect of increasing a refundable state EITC by 10 percent of the federal EITC across all household sizes, resulting in an estimate of the total effect of all aspects of state EITC expansion on household labor supply. This includes responses to changes in the kink points.
10 I calculate state bracket rates for single fi lers with one dependent with wage income equivalent to $20,000 in 2005 dollars using TaxSim version 8, available at http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/ (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993) . 11 Respondents reported how much they earned in their most recent regular job, but could report their earnings by hour, day, week, month, year, or other measure. I calculate hourly wages for all respondents and trim the top and bottom 2 percent of the wage distribution to eliminate obvious coding errors. Respondents who had not held a regular job were asked what the hourly wage would have to be for them to take a job; I use this as their regular-sector wage. 12 Experimental work by Chetty and Saez (2009) and ethnographic research by Romich and Weisner (2000) suggest that many taxpayers do not understand the structure of the credit well enough to respond to its kinks. Table 5 presents summary statistics in the last wave for the estimation sample of individuals who are unmarried at baseline and in all subsequent waves. The sample is disproportionately minority and about one third of the sample does not have a highschool education. Over half the men and 42 percent of the women are cohabiting with a partner. Over one-third of men have spent time in jail. Only 70 percent of single men in the last wave worked in the regular sector in the past 12 months. Conditional on working, they worked an average of 45.9 hours a week and 47.7 weeks per year. Service jobs, production/repair jobs, and "handler/equipment cleaner/laborer" jobs are most common among, accounting for 60 percent of workers. Among women, 59 percent worked in the regular sector in the last wave and conditional on working they worked 40.7 hours per week and 45 weeks per year. Service and administrative support account for 63 percent of women's occupations. The low education levels and household incomes indicate that many survey respondents will be eligible for the EITC. Table 6 presents results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of participation in regular and informal work on the state refundable EITC percentage and a vector of controls. 13 The EITC coeffi cient identifi es the average effect of increasing a refundable state EITC by 10 percent of the federal EITC across all household sizes. This EITC increase is associated with a weakly signifi cant 9.2 percentage-point decrease in participation in informal work among men who work in the regular sector (signifi cant at the 10 percent level). In the OLS specifi cations, there is no signifi cant effect on men's regular labor force participation or on women's regular or informal labor force participation. Mean marginal effects from pooled probit regressions (not shown) yield results very similar in magnitude and signifi cance to the OLS results. Results are also similar in magnitude and signifi cance when state policy variables are excluded and when the state EITC is measured using the non-refundable state percent of the federal credit.
VI. RESULTS

A. Participation in the Informal and Regular Sectors: Extensive Margin Results
Higher state unemployment rates are associated with lower levels of informal work for both men and women. Informal work opportunities may decrease along with regular work opportunities when the economy is weak. Higher state marginal tax rates are associated with lower regular sector labor force participation and higher informal sector participation for men. Higher state welfare benefi ts are associated with lower informalsector participation by men. Higher welfare payments to low-income women might reduce the competition low-income men face for entry-level jobs in the regular sector, in turn reducing informal-sector participation. Higher minimum wages are associated with lower informal-sector participation rates for women and with higher informal-sector participation for men (not statistically signifi cant). This is consistent with Neumark and Wascher (2011) , who fi nd that higher minimum wages appear to reduce the regularsector wages of minority men and increase wages for minority women, particularly when coupled with a large EITC. Age is positively associated with men's and women's regular labor force participation. Men and women without a high school education are less likely to participate in regular work and women without a high school education are more likely to participate in informal work than those with a high school degree (the omitted category). Cohabiting is positively associated with regular sector participation by single men. The hourly wage in the regular sector is positively associated with regular sector participation, but is not associated with participation in the informal sector. Table 7 presents the individual fi xed effects results. After controlling for individual time-invariant characteristics, an increase in the state credit of 10 percent of the federal credit reduces men's likelihood of participating in the informal sector by 5.8 percentage points overall (not statistically signifi cant), and by 7.3 percentage points conditional on participating in the regular sector (signifi cant at the 10 percent level). Men's likelihood of participating in the regular sector is higher by 2.8 percentage points.
I test whether the results are sensitive to the defi nition of the informal sector by redefi ning the sector to include only off-the-books work and not work in the respondent's own business or other types of informal work. Under this defi nition, an increase in the state credit of 10 percent of the federal credit reduces men's likelihood of participating in the informal sector by 7.7 percentage points overall and by 8.3 percentage points conditional on participating in the regular sector, signifi cant at the 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively (not shown).
As we might expect, men are less likely to work in the informal sector when its aftertax returns are lower relative to the regular sector. It is reasonable that the unconditional effect is smaller because individuals who only work in the informal sector may be less responsive to taxes. They may be more likely to engage in illegal rather than just informal work or they may prefer the informal sector for non-tax reasons. As with the pooled OLS specifi cation, there is no identifi able EITC effect on women's participation in either sector. Effects of other state policies are similar to those in the OLS specifi cation. Demographic characteristics play little role in determining labor force participation in the fi xed-effects model because most of the demographic measures change little over time.
I do not fi nd the usual large positive effect of EITCs on single women's regular-sector labor force participation in either the OLS or fi xed effects specifi cations. Although atypical, this result is not unique in the literature. Cancian and Levinson (2006) fi nd no effect of the EITC on women's regular labor force participation when comparing mothers with two and three children, nor do they fi nd effects when exploiting cross-state variation in EITC subsidy rates.
The lack of results for single mothers is somewhat surprising, but is likely due to differences between the sample of women included in this study and women in other studies. Most importantly, women in the Fragile Families data all have very young children. The women entered the survey upon giving birth so they have at least one Notes: All regressions include state, wave, and year indicators. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
Table 7
Fixed Note: All regressions include state, wave, and year indicators and all demographic controls included in Table 6 . Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. Asterisks denote signifi cance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
child age 5 or younger in every wave of the panel. Women with such young children are likely to be less responsive to employment incentives. Furthermore, because employment rates are lower overall for women with younger children, it is more diffi cult to identify signifi cant differences in rates across subgroups. Previous estimates have generally not tested for different EITC effects by age of children in the household, so I am unable to compare my results to similar results in prior studies. Additionally, I restrict the sample to individuals who remain unmarried for all four waves. Women who give birth out of wedlock and remain unmarried for fi ve years may have very different unobservable characteristics from single women overall. Again, past work has not estimated separate effects for persistently unmarried women. I also do not fi nd effects of EITCs on women's informal labor supply. Women may have less discretion about whether to report their wages because they are more likely than men to work in the administrative support, sales, and service sectors. They also may gain less from switching sectors because their average informal sector earning are lower than men's, which means that the EITC tax advantages of reporting their income are lower. Also, because only about 16 percent of women participate in the informal economy relative to over 30 percent of men, women's differences in informal economy participation across states are more diffi cult to identify.
Men's informal-sector participation is highly responsive to state EITCs, conditional on participation in the regular economy. Large EITC responses for men are most reasonable if men receive relatively large earned income credits in dollar terms, which requires that they claim qualifying children when fi ling for the EITC. If a state credit increased from 0 to 10 percent of the federal credit in 2003, the maximum credit would increase by $38 for fi lers with no children, by $255 for fi lers with one qualifying child, and by $420 for fi lers with two or more qualifying children. Men in the Fragile Families sample appear eligible for large EITCs. Depending on the wave, between 61 and 73 percent are eligible to claim at least one child for the credit, either because they have children in their household at the time of the survey or they report that the focal child lives with them at least half of the time.
14 Furthermore, approximately 80 percent of men eligible to claim a child have earned income within the credit range.
15
Although Fragile Families men's potential EITCs are relatively large, the magnitude of the estimated decline in informal sector participation is still surprising. An increase in the state credit of 10 percent of the federal credit reduces men's likelihood of participating in the informal sector by 7.3 percentage points conditional on participating in the regular sector, and the average informal economy participation rate across all waves is 31 percent. Such a large decrease in informal participation is most plausible if it is largely a reporting response as individuals switch from working off the books 14 Between 54 and 70 percent of single men in the Fragile Families data report that the survey focal child lives with them at least half the time. After the fi rst wave, between 45 and 57 percent of men report children in their household at the time of the interview. I include biological children, adopted children, and stepchildren when counting children in the household. 15 Fathers may have to negotiate with mothers over who claims the child for EITC purposes.
to reporting their income: Slemrod (1992) and Auerbach and Slemrod (1997) note that accounting responses to tax changes will be larger than changes in real activities. If many individuals are near the margin of working on or off the books, a small change in EITC rates could result in large extensive-margin changes in informal work due simply to reporting changes. If men respond to the EITC by reporting more of their work, we should expect regular sector hours worked to increase while informal hours worked decrease. Table 8 shows the effect of state EITCs on hours worked by sector. For men, OLS and fi xed-effects specifi cations indicate that regular-sector hours increase by about 3.5 to 4.5 hours per week if a state increases their EITC by 10 percent of the federal credit. Men's informal-sector hours decrease by about by about 2.2 hours/week conditional on participation in the regular sector. Results from pooled Tobit regressions are similar, although smaller and less signifi cant than the fi xed effects results. 16 When the informal sector is defi ned as only off-the-books work, the increase in the credit reduces informal sector hours per week by 1.61 hours overall and 2.47 hours conditional on working in the regular sector (not shown).
B. Hours Worked in the Informal and Regular Sectors: Intensive Margin Results
Since about 70 percent of the men in the sample already participate in the regular sector, it is reasonable that we see regular-sector effects on the hours margin as well as the participation margin. If we assume that men's reservation wages for regular-sector work are roughly normally distributed, then higher participation rates will mean that fewer men are just on the margin of participating in the regular sector. Since many men who work in the informal sector are already working in the regular sector, they can take advantage of higher after-tax wages in the regular sector by increasing their regular-sector hours.
The large negative effect of the EITC on informal sector participation suggests that much of the effect on hours worked represents a simple substitution between sectors or a change in reporting rather than a real change in labor supply. The results in Table 8 show that men's total hours worked do not change signifi cantly conditional on regular-sector participation. If true, the EITC may not affect total work among low-income men, but may change the type of work they do and may encourage reporting.
For women, a larger state EITC has a negative effect on regular-sector labor supply and total hours (but no effect on informal-sector hours). In contrast to much of the EITC literature, I fi nd an intensive-margin effect but no extensive-margin effect for women's regular labor supply. This negative effect of the EITC on hours is consistent with the income effect of the EITC. The difference between the results in the literature and those for Fragile Families mothers may be because of the demographic differences, discussed above, between Fragile Families mothers and single mothers in general.
C. Some Additional Tests
I test whether the results are sensitive to individuals' marital or cohabitation status. Including married individuals results has no effect on either the point estimate or its statistical signifi cance. The hours effects are also similar to those in the baseline specifi cation. This is not surprising because the number of married individuals in the Fragile Families data is so small. Although it would be interesting to test whether secondary earners in married couples respond to different incentives, the sample of married individuals is too small to test the effects of the EITC on that group alone.
To test whether the results are driven by the joint labor supply decisions of cohabiting couples rather than individuals living alone, I restrict the estimation sample further to include: (1) only person-year observations in which the individual is single and not cohabiting in the current wave, and (2) only individuals who are single and not cohabiting in all waves. The general pattern of results holds when the fi rst restriction is imposed. State EITCs continue to discourage informal-sector participation among men, especially when conditioning on working in the regular sector. State EITCs reduce men's hours Table 6 . Tobit results are presented as marginal effects on the observed outcome evaluated at the mean for continuous variables and effects of discrete changes from 0 to 1 for binary variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. Asterisks denote signifi cance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
worked in the informal sector and increase hours worked in the regular sector but total hours do not change signifi cantly. When the sample is restricted to those who have never cohabited, the sample size falls dramatically and none of the men's estimates are precise. The negative effect of state EITCs on women's regular-sector hours worked is not robust to varying cohabitation status. As Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz (2006) argue, if the observed changes in men's labor supply are due to in change state EITCs, we should expect state EITC policy to affect tax fi ling behavior. I examine whether EITC returns increased overall after states introduced their own EITCs using tax return data from the IRS Statistics of Income tabulated by the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center for 1997-2007. Simple fi xed effects regressions on these data, in which the dependent variable is the percent of federal tax returns with EITC claims in the state tax year and the independent variable is whether the state had is own refundable EITC, indicate that EITC claims increase by 0.4 percentage points when states introduce EITCs. Although these regressions do not control for other state characteristics, this evidence of a claiming response supports the labor supply results.
I also test whether tax fi ling behavior changed using the Fragile Families data. The survey includes questions on whether the respondent fi led taxes and, conditional on having fi led, claimed the federal earned income credit in the three waves after the baseline. Reassuringly, regressing men's federal EITC claim status on an indicator for whether the state has an EITC in a particular year and the vector of controls shows that men are 9.1 percentage points more likely to claim the federal EITC in the presence of a state earned income credit. 17 The larger magnitudes in the Fragile Families data relative to IRS data make sense because a higher percentage of Fragile Families respondents are likely to be EITC-eligible than in the general population.
I also use the Fragile Families data on tax fi ling behavior to compare EITC claimants to non-claimants. As shown in Table 9 , men who report fi ling taxes have an average of 0.19 more children in the household, are 14.7 percent more likely to have a child in their household, and are 14.9 percent more likely to report that the focal child lives with them at least half of the time. The differences in number of children in the household and probability of children in the household are larger for men who report claiming the EITC. EITC claims appear sensitive to the presence of children, which indicates that men are claiming children when fi ling for the EITC and consequently it is reasonable to expect labor supply responses consistent with large EITCs rather than the small labor supply response we might expect if these men claimed only the childless EITC. Interestingly, women who fi le taxes have fewer biological children and fewer children in the household on average, although women who claim the EITC have an average of 0.23 more children in the household. Women with more children may be less likely to work and may therefore be less likely to fi le taxes.
State credits may also affect tax claiming behavior by inducing fathers to claim more EITC-eligible children. Fathers can choose their effective tax rate (at a risk of IRS penalty) by changing the number of children they claim for the EITC and past work indicates that taxpayers do respond to these incentives. Liebman (1998) concludes that a 45 percent increase in the maximum EITC after 1996 increased the noncompliance rate due to claiming ineligible children by 14 percent and McCubbin's (2000) estimates indicate that increasing the EITC by 10 percent would lead to a 4 percent increase in the probability of claiming a child and a 14 percent increase in the dollar amount of EITC overclaims. Some evidence suggests that men are more likely to claim ineligible children for EITC purposes than women (Liebman, 1998 ; U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce, 2004). State credits expand the differences in tax rates across the number of children claimed and strengthen these incentives.
I cannot directly test whether the number of children claimed increases with state EITC size because the Fragile Families data does not report the number of children men claim for the EITC. However, regressing an indicator for whether children live with their father at least half of the time (a legal requirement for claiming them) on an indicator for whether a state has an EITC and the vector of controls shows that in states with refundable EITCs, focal children are 4.6 percentage points more likely to live with their fathers more than half of the time. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
I take advantage of changes in state earned income credits to identify changes in regular and informal labor force participation by single men and women with children. In contrast to the literature, I fi nd that the men adjust their regular-sector labor supply on the intensive as well as the extensive margin. Participation in the informal sector appears to decline by 5.8 percentage points among urban, unmarried fathers if a state increases its credit by 10 percent of the federal credit, and declines by 7.3 percentage points conditional on working in the regular sector. Regular-sector hours worked per week increase by 4.5 hours if the state increases its credit by 10 percent of the federal credit and informal-sector hours per week fall by 2.2 hours, with no signifi cant effect on total hours. This suggests that urban unmarried men with children respond to state EITCs by shifting away from informal work toward regular work. I fi nd no effects of state EITCs on single mothers' participation rates in either regular or informal work, which is likely to be due to the young age of the Fragile Families mothers' children. Single mothers' regular-sector hours worked decrease by 2.3 hours if the state increases its credit by 10 percent of the federal credit.
Recent policy proposals have called for the expansion of the EITC to noncustodial parents, and the state of New York has already implemented such a program. These results suggest that EITCs for noncustodial parents (the vast majority of whom are male) will not necessarily increase male labor force participation but may provide a useful poverty reduction tool if men report more income and receive larger EITCs. Expansions of the childless EITC have also been proposed. Since all the men in the Fragile Families sample have children and many are likely to claim children for EITC purposes, this study cannot directly address the effects of expanding the childless credit, but the differences in men's and women's responses indicate that an expansion of the childless EITC might have smaller regular labor force participation effects than past program expansions that primarily affected single women with children. In light of these results, whether these proposed EITC expansions are useful depends partly on whether policymakers' primary goal is to change labor supply or to reduce poverty. This study suggests that changing EITC policy has limited effect on men's total labor supply but does change the type of labor provided and whether income is reported.
interested in obtaining Fragile Families contract use data should refer to http://www. fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/restricted.asp for further information. All errors and omissions are my own.
